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ABSTRACT
This Article draws upon the thought of W.E.B. Du Bois and the late Professor Derrick Bell
to analyze race-conscious university admissions today. The Article has three main points. First, it
argues that there is a “double-consciousness” to race-consciousness. In other words, there are two
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different understandings of diversity, of race-neutrality, and of individualized review—the key
tenets of Supreme Court doctrine on race-conscious admissions. The double-consciousness of
diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review was prominent in the Fisher litigation and
the legal discourse around Fisher more generally, leading to much confusion.
Second, in addition to double-consciousness, this Article argues that there is another source
of confusion and contradiction in the Supreme Court’s doctrine on race-conscious admissions
policies. Together, the three prongs of diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review form a
“Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions. Currently, admissions plans cannot have these
three features together, but the Supreme Court requires universities to simultaneously strive for all
three.
Finally, this Article revisits the idea of double-consciousness and contends that advocates of
race-conscious admissions policies are, in the words of Professor Bell, “serving two masters”—
freedom of universities to be diverse and elite, and social justice for poor people of color. The
Article contends that rather than a broad pronouncement by the Supreme Court, political process
and lower court rulings will determine the fate of race-conscious admissions, at least in the near
future. The concluding section also discusses the Orwellian irony of “post-racial” America, where
victory for racial justice is hard to distinguish from defeat.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SERVING TWO MASTERS
Slightly over a decade ago, when the Supreme Court upheld diversity as a compelling interest to justify race-conscious admissions
1
policies in Grutter v. Bollinger, activists for racial justice—including
2
me —claimed to have won a huge victory. However, one of our most
cherished and respected role models had a very different reaction.
In trademark iconoclastic fashion, the late Professor Derrick Bell
3
wrote an essay entitled Diversity’s Distractions, where he called diversity a “serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial jus4
tice . . . .” Professor Bell predicted that the Court’s approval of race1

2

3
4

539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a holistic, individualized race-conscious admissions
policy at the University of Michigan Law School after finding a compelling state interest
in attaining the educational benefits of diversity). Grutter affirmed the diversity rationale
as a compelling interest and the use of race as a flexible “plus” factor—both of which the
Supreme Court first articulated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). On the same day Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court struck down the
University of Michigan College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences’ race-conscious admissions
plan, which automatically awarded twenty points on a 150 point scale to applicants from
designated minority groups. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that
because the points system was not narrowly tailored to achieve the University’s
compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
With occasional exception for word variety, this Article uses the term “race-conscious
admissions” rather than “affirmative action,” because the latter refers to a broader range
of programs and policies than just university admissions, even though it is commonly
used to refer specifically to race-conscious admissions policies. Also, this Article uses the
term “university” to refer to selective institutions of higher education generally, including
colleges and professional schools that are not technically “universities.” Unless otherwise
indicated, the arguments herein apply broadly to selective institutions of higher
education.
While at the University of Pennsylvania, I founded the CALL TO ACTION Project, a
student initiative to defend race-conscious admissions policies, leading up to the Supreme
Court oral arguments in Gratz and Grutter. See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence,
and Awakening: A South Asian Becoming “Critically” Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 80 (2009) [hereinafter Harpalani, Ambiguity] (noting that the
CALL TO ACTION project was founded in response to the right wing assault on
affirmative action and to promote racial justice through scholarship and activism). See
also Vinay Harpalani, Activism With the Pen, Not the Sword, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 23,
2003, at 6 [hereinafter Harpalani, Activism] (discussing how I formed the CALL TO
ACTION project to mobilize the Penn community in defense of affirmative action).
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003).
Id. at 1622 (arguing that “the concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring
affirmative action in the admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious
distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice”). See also, e.g., Charles R.
Lawrence, III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 928, 931 (2001) (expressing “concern[] that liberal supporters of
affirmative action have used the diversity argument to defend affirmative action at elite
universities and law schools without questioning the ways that traditional admissions
criteria continue to perpetuate race and class privilege”). Professor Bell was one of my
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conscious admissions policies, with diversity as the compelling interest to constitutionally justify them, would merely invite further litigation; simultaneously, it would divert attention from race and classrelated inequalities and from universities’ reliance on admissions criteria that benefit more privileged applicants, such as grades and test
5
scores. He also forecasted that, in the long run, “this latest civil
6
rights victory” would be “hard to distinguish from defeat.”

5

mentors, and this Article is inspired by his work. For other, similar critiques of diversity,
see Derrick Bell, What’s Diversity Got to Do With It? 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 527, 529
(2008) (“We must even consider that racial diversity is a snare, and not an efficient means
of achieving effective schooling for children who are poor or minority group members.”);
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White
Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 450 (2014) (noting that the diversity rationale
has been criticized “for failing to advance racial justice, for primarily benefiting white
institutions instead of students of color, for legitimizing admissions policies that favor the
privileged, and for potentially pitting minority students against each other”); Eboni S.
Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 582 (2009) (arguing that
the pursuit of diversity has come at a cost to the provision of equal opportunities to
minority students). See also Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2156
(2013) (“The irony, then, is that our legal and social emphasis on diversity —while
intended to produce progress toward a racially egalitarian society —has instead in many
cases contributed to a state of affairs that . . . relegates nonwhite individuals to the status
of ‘trophies’ or ‘passive emblems.’”) (citing Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (2011)).
Bell, supra note 3, at 1622. Professor Bell also referred to the race-conscious admissions
policies approved in Grutter as “litigation-prompting compensation for admissions criteria
that benefit the already privileged and greatly burden the already disadvantaged.” Id. at
1631. Ironically, in spite of their vast ideological differences, Professor Derrick Bell and
Justice Antonin Scalia did agree that Grutter would invite more litigation. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike a clear
constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are
impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state
educational institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely
designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.”).
Grutter also provided an interesting point of confluence between Professor Derrick
Bell and Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas devoted one section of his Grutter
dissent largely to critiquing the use of standardized tests in admissions—a view shared by
Professor Bell. Compare id. at 367–71 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Law School’s
continued adherence to measures [like the LSAT that] it knows produce racially skewed
results is not entitled to deference by this Court.”), with Bell, supra note 3, at 1630
(“Standardized tests . . . give an advantage to candidates from higher socioeconomic
backgrounds and disproportionately screen out women, people of color, and those in
lower income brackets.”). Additionally, Justice Thomas was critical of universities’
elitism—another point of partial agreement with Professor Bell. Compare Grutter at 355–
56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [University of Michigan] Law School seeks . . . [to
enroll a racially diverse student body] . . . without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity
and elite status.”), with Bell, supra note 3, at 1622 (“Diversity serves to give undeserved
legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores that privilege well-to-do, mainly
white applicants.”). Of course, Justice Thomas’s broader view of race-conscious policies is
very different than that of Professor Bell. See id. at 1632 (Professor Bell noting that
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Many years later, after working with Professor Bell and getting to
know him well, his prediction reminds me of W.E.B. Du Bois’s classic
metaphor of “double-consciousness”:
that “peculiar sensation . . . of . . . two-ness . . . two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
7
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body . . . .” Professor Bell
knew plenty about such “warring ideals”—captured eloquently in his
8
classic article, Serving Two Masters. There, he analyzed the conflict
between “integration ideals and client interests in school desegrega9
10
tion litigation” after Brown v. Board of Education. Professor Bell’s
implicit use of the double-consciousness metaphor could just as easily
apply to Grutter, where civil rights advocates felt similarly conflicted
about serving two masters: universities’ freedom to be diverse and
11
elite, and the advocates’ own ideals of racial equality and justice,

6
7

8

9
10

11

“Justice Thomas knows that [an elite university admissions] process is not based on merit,
but his view of the Fourteenth Amendment is impotent to address the unfairness.”).
Bell, supra note 3, at 1622.
W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903) (“It is a peculiar
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the
eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (describing tension between the goals
of civil rights advocates and those of their clients). Professor Bell derived the “serving two
masters” metaphor from the New Testament. See id. at 472 n.4 (quoting Luke 16:13 (King
James) (“No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the
other; or else he will hold to one, and despise the other.”). For an interesting analysis of
parallels between the work of Professor Bell and W.E.B. Du Bois, see James R. Hackney,
Jr., Derrick Bell’s Re-Sounding: W. E. B. Du Bois, Modernism, and Critical Race Scholarship, 23
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 141, 142 (1998) (analyzing how W. E. B. Du Bois’s ideas “are taken
up, transformed, and re-sounded by later generations” of scholars, including Professor
Derrick Bell).
Bell, Jr., supra note 8, at 470.
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools were unconstitutional);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering racial integration of
segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed”). W.E.B. Du Bois and Professor
Derrick Bell expressed a similar ambivalence about racial integration of schools. See
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 102–22
(1987) (arguing that “[n]either separate schools nor mixed schools” necessarily provide
Black children with better education); Bell, Jr., supra note 8, at 516 (“[A] single minded
commitment to racial balance . . . [is] all too often educationally impotent.”); W. E.
Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935)
(arguing that quality of education is more important than whether schools are separate
or integrated).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting “a constitutional dimension,
grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy” for universities); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“The freedom of a university to make its
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”); cf. Grutter,
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which extended far beyond the elite. 12 And with my ties to Professor
13
14
Derrick Bell and to W.E.B. Du Bois, I see double-consciousness as
a very fitting metaphor to understand race-conscious university admissions today.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions is confusing and convoluted, to say the least.
The Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin illus15
After granting certiorari and deliberating for eight
trated this.
16
months after oral argument, the Court did very little that was new.

12

13

14

15
16

539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require . . . a university to choose between
maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”); id. at 340 (rejecting “the
suggestion that the Law School simply lower admissions standards for all students,
[because this is] a drastic remedy that would require the Law School to become a much
different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its educational mission”); id. at
355–56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he [University of
Michigan] Law School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without
sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.”).
See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity and Community Upliftment, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Mar. 13,
2013, http://www.thedp.com/article/2013/03/vinay-harpalani-diversity-and-communityupliftment (noting that “elite, private universities like Penn . . . prefer[] minority students
from privileged schools over those who are less privileged”); Vinay Harpalani, A Long
Legacy of Activism at Penn, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 9, 2003, http://www.thedp.com/
article/2003/04/vinay_harpalani_a_long_legacy_of_activism_at_penn (“[D]iversity was
not the original motivation behind affirmative action. Affirmative action programs in
higher education began as radical desegregation measures; they were demanded by
people of color who were fighting for equality . . . . Unfortunately, while the current
Penn administration embraces ‘diversity,’ it has forgotten how Penn became diverse in
the first place.”).
I served as the Derrick Bell Fellow at New York University (NYU) School of Law in 2009–
10, sharing an office with Professor Bell for my first job out of law school and assisting
him with teaching his classes. See Vinay Harpalani, From Roach Powder to Radical
Humanism: Professor Derrick Bell’s “Critical” Constitutional Pedagogy, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
xxiii (2013) (describing Professor Derrick Bell’s teaching and life philosophies and his
impact on students).
I served as a graduate resident advisor (1999–2003) and faculty fellow (2005–2006) in the
W.E.B. Du Bois College House at the University of Pennsylvania and spent many hours
analyzing and discussing Du Bois’s writings. See Harpalani, Ambiguity, supra note 2, at 81
(“Looking at myself through the eyes of Du Bois College House became part of my own
‘double-consciousness[.]’”).
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
In Fisher, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the University of Texas at Austin
(“UT”) had a constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions policy, but it did not
deem UT’s policy to be unconstitutional. Rather, it remanded the case for more
stringent review, holding that the District Court for the Western District of Texas and
Fifth Circuit had “confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to
the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications[.]” Id. at 2421. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 2432. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the
decision. Id. at 2422.
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Seven Justices signed on to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion, agreeing essentially to make no major alteration to the Court’s
2003 framework from Grutter v. Bollinger—even though three of them,
17
including Justice Kennedy, had dissented in Grutter. The only new
tenet from Fisher was that courts must review compliance with Grutter
18
more stringently. Race-conscious admissions policies are constitutionally permissible in the manner prescribed by Grutter: they must
19
be necessary to fulfill the compelling interest in diversity, and they
20
must involve individualized review of applicants. But courts must

17

18

19

20

My prior Article in the Journal of Constitutional Law partially foreshadowed the result
in Fisher. See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of RaceConscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463, 526 (2012) (“If the Supreme Court
adopted . . . [the test that I propose] . . . it would vacate the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher,
but it would not declare UT’s race-conscious policy to be unconstitutional. Rather, it
would remand the case for review based on the more stringent standard proposed
here.”). Compare Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (stating that UT has to “prove that its
admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity”),
with Harpalani, supra, at 526 (stating that UT should have to prove that its race-conscious
policy is “narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest of attaining within-group
diversity and its educational benefits”). The Supreme Court called for the same standard
as did my Article, although not for the same reasons; it did not address the issue of
within-group diversity, which was the specific focus of my prior Article.
Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit has once again affirmed the District Court’s ruling
upholding UT’s race-conscious admissions policies. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758
F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). A petition for rehearing en banc was denied on November
12, 2014. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Fisher-en-banc-denial-1112-14.pdf. Nevertheless, the case could still be heard again by the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Lyle Denniston, Fisher Case on Way Back to the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 12, 2014,
3:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/fisher-case-on-way-back-to-the-court.
See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (containing only one dissent—by Justice Ginsberg—and having
been heard without Justice Kagan present); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–49
(2003) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 349–78 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting);
id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’” (citation omitted)); see also Grutter, 539
U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. . . . In the
context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions
in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (recognizing that there is at least “one compelling interest that
could justify the consideration of race: the interest in the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body”); id. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational
benefits of diversity. . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 2418 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program . . . must
remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual. . . .”
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 337) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37 (“When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university admissions, a
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now closely assess whether a university can use race-neutral policies
21
instead and achieve the same diversity result. Read together, Grutter
and Fisher create a perplexing nexus between diversity, individualized
review, and race-neutrality. The Court’s more recent decision in
Schuette v. BAMN does not shed any light on the issue, as Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion clearly stated that Schuette—which upheld
Michigan’s state ban on race-conscious policies—was “not about the
constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies
22
in higher education.”
This Article has three main points. First, it argues that there is a
“double-consciousness” to race-consciousness. In other words, there
are two different understandings of diversity, of race-neutrality, and
of individualized review—the key tenets of Supreme Court doctrine
23
on race-conscious admissions. The double-consciousness of diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review was prominent in the
Fisher litigation and the legal discourse around Fisher more generally.
Litigants, commentators, and the courts have all proffered different
views of these key tenets, leading to much confusion.

21

22

23

university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of this
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount.”); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978)
(considering the “denial . . . of th[e] right to individualized consideration without regard
to . . . race” to be the “principal evil” of the medical school’s admissions program).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (calling for “a careful
judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using
racial classifications”). See also id. (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that
no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense.’”). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher
was consistent with the “Kennedy template” for Grutter’s demise, articulated by Professor
Ellen Katz prior to the decision. See Ellen D. Katz, Grutter’s Denouement: Three Templates
From the Roberts Court, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1051, 1053 (2013) (explaining that Justice
Kennedy’s prior opinions in Grutter and two other cases form a template that, if applied
in Fisher, would require the Court to “examine with rigor the distinct ways administrators
at the University of Texas (UT) use racial criteria to pursue their goal of racial diversity
on campus” but “would nevertheless leave undisturbed Grutter’s recognition that the goal
of diversity is a compelling objective that school administrators may lawfully pursue”).
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights
and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014).
Rather than evaluating the merits of race-conscious admissions policies, the Court in
Schuette only considered “whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to
prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular
with respect to school admissions.” Id. In other words, Schuette was “not about how the
debate over racial preferences should be resolved. It [wa]s about who may resolve it.” Id.
at 1638.
See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
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Second, in addition to double-consciousness, this Article argues
that there is another source of confusion and contradiction in the
Supreme Court’s doctrine on race-conscious admissions policies.
The three prongs of diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review form a “Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions. An admissions plan cannot currently have these three features together, but
the Supreme Court requires universities to simultaneously strive for
24
all three.
Finally, this Article revisits the idea of double-consciousness and
the notion of serving two masters. It contends that, at least in the
near future, state and local politics and lower court rulings will determine the fate of race-conscious admissions policies, rather than a
broad national pronouncement by the Supreme Court.
This concluding section also examines Professor Bell’s prediction
and discusses how advocates of race-conscious policies continue to
grapple with their own double-consciousness, and more generally
with the irony of “post-racial” America—where it is hard to distinguish between victory and defeat for racial justice.
II. THE DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS OF RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS
The Supreme Court has always had its own internal conflict over
race-conscious admissions policies, due to its growingly conservative
composition since their advent. Ever since their fractured 1978 ruling in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke—where Justice Lewis Powell’s controlling opinion espoused diversity as a compelling interest, struck down racial set-asides in higher education, but upheld
25
the use of race as a “plus factor” in admissions —the Justices have
been very divided in their views of race-conscious admissions. Over
four separate dissents, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored a 5-4
Grutter majority opinion that affirmed all the central tenets of Bakke
26
and, in conjunction with Gratz v. Bollinger, established individualized

24
25

26

See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (finding that “the attainment of a diverse student
body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education”). Justice Powell stated that while racial set-asides were unconstitutional, race
could be used as an individual “plus” factor for applicants in order to achieve the
compelling interest of attaining the educational benefits of diversity. Id. at 317 (“[R]ace
or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does
not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats.”).
539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s race-conscious
undergraduate admissions policy on the grounds that, because it involved a fixed point
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review of applicants as a necessary condition of any race-conscious
admissions policy. Grutter also required universities to give “good
27
faith consideration” to race-neutral alternatives, and to eventually
28
phase out race-conscious admissions policies when feasible.
Unlike Bakke and Grutter, Fisher was not a fractured ruling in the
usual sense. Seven of the eight Justices who heard the case signed on
29
to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Nevertheless, Fisher’s reaffirmation of the diversity interest—without any further clarification of
it—and its emphasis on stringent review of race-neutral alternatives
both reinforce the Court’s divisions on this charged issue. Diversity,
race-neutrality, and individualized review all have their own doubleconsciousness—due to the Supreme Court’s internal disagreements,
and due to varying understandings of these tenets at large.
A. Diversity’s Double-Consciousness: It’s More than the Numbers
Diversity is of course fundamental to the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions policies: it is the compelling state interest that
30
justifies them. But what exactly is this compelling interest and how
do we determine if a race-conscious admissions policy is necessary to
attain it? These are difficult questions, in part because of diversity’s
double-consciousness.
On the one hand, the language of Grutter and Fisher highlights the
educational benefits of diversity in higher education settings as the
31
compelling interest. Professor Devon Carbado identifies eight benefits of diversity that Justice O’Connor espoused in her Grutter majority opinion: diversity serves to “promote speech and the robust exchange of ideas . . . effectuate the inclusion of underrepresented
students . . . change the character of the school . . . disrupt and negate racial stereotypes . . . facilitate racial cooperation and understanding . . . create pathways to leadership . . . ensure democratic le-

27

28

29
30
31

system rather than flexible, individualized review of applicants, it was therefore not
sufficiently narrowly tailored).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the
diversity the university seeks.”).
Id. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time . . . . In the
context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions
in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013).
See supra notes 1, 19 & 25.
See supra notes 1, 19 & 25.
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gitimacy [and] . . . prevent racial isolation and alienation[.]” 32 The
Fisher opinion itself focused on “the educational benefits that flow
33
from a diverse student body” as the “one compelling interest that
34
could justify the consideration of race” in admissions. Through its
Grutter and Fisher majority opinions, the Supreme Court has framed
the diversity interest in terms of educational activities and exchanges
between diverse groups of students—intangibles that improve the
quality of education for all involved.
On the other hand, however, because the educational benefits of
diversity are difficult to measure and review, litigants in Fisher framed
diversity in terms of numerical representation: numbers and percentages of various groups of minority students. Because the Supreme Court in Bakke prohibited the use of numerical goals or quotas
35
for race-conscious admissions, the Fisher litigation focused on the
presence of a “critical mass” of underrepresented students—a concept that attempts to combine numerical representation with the ed36
And as we saw in Fisher, “critical
ucational benefits of diversity.
37
mass” turns out to be a rather vague concept.
32
33
34
35

36

37

Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1145–46 (2013).
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (noting that the school’s
admissions program neglected to consider enough “qualifications and characteristics” of
applicants and therefore could not attain “diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003) (“[C]ritical mass means numbers such
that underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for
their race.”); see also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004)
(“[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate where
one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not feel the opprobrium of
being a token, nor the burden of being the designated representative for an entire group.
It also implies a climate where one can speak freely, where one not only has a voice, but a
voice that will be heard.”). For more discussion of different definitions of “critical mass”
in the context of race-conscious admissions policies, see Harpalani, supra note 16, at 471–
85; Vinay Harpalani, Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY
57, 58–66 (2013) [hereinafter Harpalani, Fishing Expedition].
See generally Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36 (discussing the various ways of
defining “critical mass”). But see William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209
and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 63 (2013) (“The benefits associated with
‘critical mass’ are highly context-dependent and not amenable to a one-size-fits-all
admissions target, but these benefits are no less real and measurable because they are
manifest in the complex ecosystem of higher learning.”). Chancellor Kidder’s assertion
about critical mass here also distinguishes between two different uses of the concept: (1)
universities’ campus-specific determinations of diversity’s benefits and minority students’
needs, which this Article endorses; and (2) courts’ use of critical mass as a generalizable
standard to review the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies, which this
Article critiques. See also William C. Kidder, The Salience of Racial Isolation: African
Americans’ and Latinos’ Perceptions of Climate and Enrollment Choices with and without
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The plaintiffs in Fisher based their claim on “critical mass”: they
argued that the 21.4% minority (Black and Latina/o combined) enrollment at the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”), attained in 2004
38
with the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law alone, was a “critical
mass” and fulfilled the constitutionally permissible compelling interest in diversity. Consequently, they contended that UT was not justified in using a race-conscious admissions policy in addition to the
Top Ten Percent Law.
UT’s response to the plaintiff’s argument also focused on numerical representation. It pointed to low percentages of Black and Latina/o students in many small classes to show that it had not attained a
39
Although UT did allude to the linkage between
“critical mass.”
“critical mass” and the educational benefits of diversity, its emphasis
was also on numbers sufficient (or insufficient) to constitute a “criti40
cal mass.”
But neither the Fisher plaintiffs nor UT could provide a measurable definition of “critical mass.” Ironically, both parties agreed that
“critical mass” implied numbers such that minority students “do not
41
feel isolated and like spokespersons for their race,” but neither

38

39
40
41

Proposition 209, at 13, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2012), available at http://
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/affirmative-action/the-salience-ofracial-isolation-african-americans2019-and-latinos2019-perceptions-of-climate-andenrollment-choices-with-and-without-proposition-209/. (“The data lend support to the
concept of ‘critical mass’ while acknowledging that context matters and it is unrealistic to
expect an across-the-board numerical definition of what constitutes sufficient critical
mass.”).
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 1997). The Top Ten Percent Law guarantees
admission to UT to the top students (originally top 10 percent of each graduating class)
in all Texas public high schools. The law was passed by the Texas legislature in response
to Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that UT Law could not use race
as an admissions factor), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding
that universities could use race as a plus factor in admissions). In 2011, the Top Ten
Percent Law was amended to limit guaranteed admission at UT to 75% of the seats
designated for Texas residents. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) (West 2010).
This limit begins with admissions to the entering class of Fall 2011 and continues until
the entering class of Fall 2015. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224
n.56 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
The Fisher litigation and ruling assumed that the Top Ten Percent Law is “raceneutral.” But see infra note 68.
See Harpalani, supra note 16, at 504–06, and sources cited therein.
See Harpalani, supra note 16.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345) (noting by plaintiff’s counsel that the question to consider when
determining if a critical mass exists is whether underrepresented minority students are
“isolated . . . [and] unable to speak out[.]”); id. at 47 (noting by UT’s counsel that to
determine if critical mass is present, “we look to feedback directly from students about
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could say how to determine when this occurs. The plaintiffs con42
tended it was UT’s burden to define and measure critical mass. UT
offered that surveys of student isolation, along with other campus data including numerical representation of various groups, could help
43
determine whether a critical mass was present, but it did not provide
any guidance on how to do this—much less on how to determine
whether race-conscious policies are necessary to achieve the “critical
mass.” This led Justice Antonin Scalia to say, derisively, “[w]e should
stop calling it ‘critical mass’ . . . call it a cloud or something like
44
that.”
The only reliably measurable diversity-related outcome in the Fisher litigation was the numerical representation of minority students itself—on campus and in various classes. And focus on numerical representation poses its own conundrum: Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher
clearly stated that numerical goals for race-conscious admissions poli45
cies are unconstitutional. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recognized this
at the Fisher oral argument, when she said to plaintiffs’ counsel: “Boy,
it sounds awfully like a quota to me that you shouldn’t be setting
46
goals, that you shouldn’t be setting quotas . . . .”
In spite of the focus on numerical representation by litigants in
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, the controlling opinions in all of these cases
indicate that the goal of a race-conscious admissions policy is more
nuanced than attaining any numerical index of diversity:

42
43

44
45

46

racial isolation that they experience” and ask, “[d]o they feel like spokespersons for their
race[?]”).
Id. at 16–17 (noting by plaintiff’s counsel that it is “not [the Plaintiff’s] burden to
establish the number” that constitutes critical mass).
Id. at 47–49 (noting by UT’s counsel that critical mass is determined via “feedback [via
surveys] directly from students about racial isolation that they experience,” “enrollment
data, . . . [d]iversity in the classroom[,] . . . [and] the racial climate on campus”).
Id. at 71–72. The courtroom erupted in laughter after Justice Scalia made this statement.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Law School’s
interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin’ . . . [t]hat would amount to
outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional” (citing Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978))); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“To be narrowly
tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system[.]”) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 656 (5th Cir.
2014) (“[A]n examination that looks exclusively at the percentage of minority students
fails before it begins.”).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 19. But see Sheldon Lyke, Catch TwentyWu? The Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas and the Obfuscation of Critical Mass,
107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 216 (2013), available at http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/19/LRColl2013n19Lyke.pdf (arguing that “critical mass
has both quantitative and qualitative elements” and that “contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s
claim[,] . . . goals and quotas are [not] synonymous”).
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It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important ele47
ment.
48

Diversity is thus caught between “two unreconciled strivings” : the
educational benefits of nuanced, individualized race-conscious admissions—emphasized in the language of all major Supreme Court
cases—and the numerical representation of minority groups, which
provides the main data used to make arguments for and against race49
conscious admissions policies. Fisher did not resolve this doubleconsciousness, and lower courts will have to grapple with the issue
and decide how to assess diversity.
B. Individualized Review’s Double-Consciousness: Is It Just the Numbers?
Individualized review of applicants is a requirement for any constitutionally-permissible race-conscious admissions policy under Grutter
50
and Fisher —a requirement that, in a sense, also has a doubleconsciousness of its own. The Grutter and Fisher majority opinions described holistic admissions policies that consider race in a flexible,
nuanced, and individualized manner, in conjunction with other admissions factors, and the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Fisher on remand
emphasized that individuals of any race could benefit in the admis51
sions process. Individualized review in this vein is discretionary, sub47
48

49

50
51

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at
315).
DU BOIS, supra note 7 (“One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls,
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.”).
Justice Clarence Thomas critiques this double-consciousness of diversity in his Grutter
dissent. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“ A distinction between these
two ideas (unique educational benefits based on racial aesthetics and race for its own
sake) is purely sophistic-so much so that the majority uses them interchangeably.”).
See supra note 20.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 2014) (“No numerical value
is ever assigned to . . . race . . . [which] is a factor considered in the unique context of
each applicant’s entire experience . . . [and] . . . may be a beneficial factor for a minority
or a non-minority student.”); id. at 659 (“Race is relevant to minority and non-minority,
notably when candidates have flourished as a minority in their school—whether they are
white or black.”); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin., 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir.
2011), vacated, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (noting that in
framework of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy, “race can enhance the personal
achievement score of a student from any racial background, including whites and AsianAmericans”).
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jective, and, above all, flexible. However, critics of race-conscious
admissions contend that this is a smokescreen— that elite universities
merely institute a thin veneer of individualized review and holistic
admissions to cover much larger systematic “race preferences” for
particular groups, usually African Americans, Latina/os, and Native
Americans. To these critics, the university admissions game is still
numbers-centered and only three factors really matter: GPA, stand52
ardized test scores, and race. Thus, there is a discord between how
Supreme Court doctrine describes individualized review and how
53
some perceive that elite university admissions use it in practice.
52

53

See, e.g., RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 18–19
(2012) (“At most large schools . . . descriptions [such as ‘holistic’] are completely
fanciful; admissions are driven by fairly mechanical decision rules. . . .[E]ven at schools
that truly do make decisions on a case-by-case basis . . . implicit weight given to . . . [an]
applicant’s race . . . is generally very large indeed.”). But see Rachel Rubin, Who Gets In and
Why? An Examination of Admissions to America’s Most Selective Colleges and Universities, 2 INT’L EDUC. RES. 1 (2014), http://www.todayscience.org/IER/article/ier.v2i2p01.p
df (analyzing and describing variations and nuances of holistic admissions plans at different types of universities).
There is a school of thought suggesting that it is better not to know the particulars of
race-conscious policies, to avoid stigmatization. See Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence:
Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems may have
significant advantages, not so much in terms of the processes of consideration as in the
felt impact of their operation over time. The description of race as simply ‘another
factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense
that minority students are separate and different and the recipients of special
dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the
opposite effect.”); see also Heather Gerkin, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (2007) (characterizing Justices Powell and
O’Connor’s views as “something akin to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to raceconscious decisionmaking: use race, but don’t be obvious about it” (internal citation
omitted)); Daniel Sabbagh, Judicial Uses of Subterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 118
POL. SCI. Q. 411, 412 (2003) (“[T]he very nature of what may be conceived as the
ultimate goal of affirmative action—namely, the deracialization of American society,
insofar as racial identification remains inextricably bound up with a constellation of
inegalitarian assumptions—would make it counterproductive to fully disclose that policy’s
most distinctive and most contentious features—its nonmeritocratic component and the
extent to which some of these programs take race into account. . . .[I]n several Supreme
Court decisions . . . judges have made a significant, yet underappreciated, contribution to
that rational process of minimizing the visibility and distinctiveness of race-based
affirmative action.”). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1899, 1902 (2006) (critiquing Grutter because “[i]t is hardly clear that the Constitution
should be taken to require a procedure that sacrifices transparency, predictability, and
equal treatment . . .”); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action
Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based DecisionMaking by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 528 (2004) (“One can argue that
the undergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz, involving a fixed-point system,
should have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion model
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Beyond this double-consciousness, individualized review affects
our understanding of both diversity and race-neutrality. It is through
individualized review that a university admissions committee can use
race in a flexible, nuanced manner, in conjunction with other admis54
sions factors, and thus fulfill the compelling interest in diversity ar55
ticulated in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher. Both Grutter and Fisher specifically noted that the breakdown of racial stereotypes is one of the
56
educational benefits of diversity, and that universities can use indi57
vidualized review to identify applicants to help accomplish this end.
At the Fisher oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli—
arguing in favor of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy—
contended that one purpose of such a policy is to identify individuals
58
who defy racial stereotypes, such as “the African American fencer.”
If identifying and admitting individuals who break down racial stereotypes is part of the compelling interest in diversity, this creates a conundrum for race-neutrality: there is no race-neutral policy that can
identify and admit African American fencers. By definition, one must
consider race in order to do so.
But even if such nuanced use of race is not necessary to fulfill the
diversity interest, individualized review has broader consequences for

54
55
56

57

58

in Grutter . . . . At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been
structured, confined, and checked . . . . The point system used in the undergraduate
program struck down in Gratz should instead have been preferred because it makes the
racial remedy visible . . . .”).
See supra note 20.
See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity
is designed to produce . . . are substantial . . . [and include] break[ing] down racial
stereotypes[.]”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (noting
that educational benefits of diversity include “lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes”).
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (noting that in the framework of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy, “a
white student who has demonstrated substantial community involvement at a
predominantly Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a
greater personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the
same school . . . [and] just as in Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit
supplemental information to highlight their potential diversity contributions, which
allows students who are diverse in unconventional ways to describe their unique
attributes”).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 61 ( “[U]niversities . . . are looking . . . to
make individualized decisions about applicants who will directly further the educational
mission. For example, they will look for individuals who will play against racial
stereotypes . . . [t]he African American fencer; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered
classical Greek.”).
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our understanding of race-neutrality—as the next section on the
double-consciousness of race-neutrality will show.
C. Race-Neutrality’s Double-Consciousness: It Is the Numbers!
Unlike diversity and individualized review, race-neutrality is not
(and cannot be!) part of the constitutional requirement for raceconscious admissions. It is actually the opposite: the absence of viable race-neutral policies that can attain the compelling interest in diversity is a constitutional requirement for any university using race59
conscious admissions. But like diversity and individualized review,
race-neutrality also suffers from its own double-consciousness—and
perhaps even more so. It can have at least two different meanings,
and the Supreme Court has not even acknowledged these disparate
understandings of race-neutrality, much less addressed them in any
meaningful way.
One definition of race-neutrality is “colorblindness”: information
about an applicant’s race is completely absent in the admissions process—or, at least, it cannot be considered by admissions reviewers. In
60
Fisher, the Supreme Court and the litigants held to this view. But
race-neutrality in this formal sense can occur only in an admissions
process that is mechanistic—that is, without individualized review or
discretion by admissions officers. In such a process, admissions decisions occur automatically, based on academic criteria such as GPAs,
class rank, and/or standardized test scores. Texas’s Top Ten Percent
Plan is one example of such an admissions plan, which is why Fisher
held to this definition.
This type of formal race-neutrality is difficult to achieve in a holistic admissions process, where race is not as simple as a box that applicants can check. Individualized review inherently provides admissions officers with discretion, along with plenty of other information
about each applicant. Applicants’ personal statements and essays, ex61
62
tracurricular activities, and even their names may reveal clues as to
59

60
61

Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity . . . ‘at tolerable administrative expense . . . .’”).
See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36, at 69–71 (discussing how race was a small
factor in the UT admissions process).
See How Berkeley Selects Students, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY OFFICE OF
UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/selectsstudents (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014) (providing a description of selection criteria for admission,
including a “holistic review of all information—both academic and personal”); The
Personal Statement, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY OFFICE OF UNDERGRADUATE
ADMISSIONS, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/personalstatement (last visited Dec. 31,
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their racial/ethnic background. Admissions officers’ unconscious biases may come into play during their individualized review of applications, and conscious biases can also come into play: those reviewers
who desire to increase the number of admitted minority students already have access to the information to do so. Even in states with
constitutional bans on race-conscious admissions, there have been
accusations that admissions officers consider race subversively, as individualized review and holistic admissions plans allow them to do
63
so. Moreover, there is no practical way to fully eliminate this phe64
nomenon.

62

63

64

2014) (calling the personal statement “a vital part of [an applicant’s] application”). The
first prompt to which applicants must respond is, “Describe the world you come from—
for example, your family, community or school—and tell us how your world has shaped
your dreams and aspirations.” See The Personal Statement, supra. In response to this
prompt, applicants can readily allude to their racial background and members of
underrepresented minority groups can self-identify.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
without affirmative action, “[s]eeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants
may highlight . . . the Hispanic surnames of their mothers or grandparents”). See generally
Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black
Names, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 767 (2004) (discussing the shift from similarities between black
and white names in the 1960s to distinctly African American names in the 1970s).
See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36, at 70–72. See also SANDER & TAYLOR, supra
note 52, at 169–70 (contending that, as of 2012, “the University of California system is
still, formally race-neutral, but in practice it has come very close to a form of racial
proportionality . . . [and that] . . . neither voters nor state officials can end university
racial preferences by a single stroke”); id. at 158 (contending that after Proposition 209
(California’s constitutional ban on race-conscious policies) was passed in 1996, faculty in
the University of California system “spoke of the feasibility of evasion” for “small
programs,” where “[t]he number of students was so small, and the criteria for selection so
subjective, that outside investigators could not easily detect racial discrimination”).
Professors Sander and Taylor also note that “[f]or larger programs, such as law schools or
business schools, that [subversive use of race] would obviously be more difficult.” Id. But
see TIM GROSECLOSE, REPORT ON SUSPECTED MALFEASANCE IN UCLA ADMISSIONS AND THE
ACCOMPANYING COVER-UP (2008), available at
http://images.ocregister.com/
newsimages/news/2008/08/CUARSGrosecloseResignationReport.pdf; CHEATING: AN
INSIDER’S REPORT ON THE USE OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS AT UCLA (2014).
One article on the UCLA controversy questioned whether “holistic” admissions
policies simply help Black applicants. Scott Jaschik, Is “Holistic” Admissions a Cover for
Helping Black Applicants?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/02/ucla.
See Jaschik, supra note 63 (describing UCLA’s insistence on the sufficiency and legality of
its admissions process); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (exploring unconscious racial biases in
admissions and raising “the question of whether race can in fact be eliminated from
admissions processes”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of
Affirmative Action as Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007) (noting that “the line between race-based and raceblind policy making can be quite blurry”).
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Most elite universities—and particularly private universities—use
holistic admissions plans with individualized review. Grutter and Fisher
endorsed this type of admissions plan and went as far as to require it
65
if race is to be an admissions factor. As such, if race-neutrality is understood in formal terms, Grutter’s and Fisher’s narrow tailoring principles are self-contradictory: their requirement for holistic, individualized review undercuts their espoused goal of race-neutrality.
A second definition of race-neutrality, which is more compatible
with holistic admissions plans, is rooted in statistical disparities rather
than in formal absence of race. Here, we can define race-neutrality
as the lack of any significant statistical disparities between minority
and non-minority admittees on academic criteria such as grades, class
rank, and standardized test scores. Under this view, it does not matter that admissions reviewers can access and even consider information about an applicant’s race, so long as doing so does not lead to
significant statistical disparities in admitted applicants’ academic criteria by race.
Such statistical disparities are the major concern of critics of raceconscious admissions policies. Plaintiffs in Bakke and Grutter (but not
in Fisher) relied heavily on such statistical disparities to make constitu66
tional arguments against race-conscious admissions policies. Also,
proponents of “mismatch theory” focus on those disparities to con67
tend that race-conscious policies can harm minority students. In
this vein, it makes sense to effectively deem an admissions process as
race-neutral if there are no academic disparities between admitted

65
66

67

See supra note 20.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277–78 n.7 (comparing Plaintiff Alan
Bakke’s GPA and MCAT scores “with the average scores of regular admittees and of
special admittees in both 1973 and 1974”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d
821, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(discussing how the plaintiffs’ expert witness concluded that “all the graphs comparing
Native American, African American, Mexican American, and Puerto Rican applicants to
Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a much higher
probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection index value”
(quotation marks omitted)). But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the
Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002), cited in Gratz,
539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In any admissions process where applicants
greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority
applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish
the odds of admission facing white applicants.”).
In its critiques of race-conscious admissions, “mismatch theory” also focuses on statistical
academic disparities between admitted students of different racial groups. See generally
SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 52. For a critique of mismatch theory, see generally Stacy
L. Hawkins, Mismatched Or Counted Out? How Mismatch Theory Is Incomplete, What’s Missing,
and Why It Matters, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 855 (2015).
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minority and non-minority applicants, regardless of whether the process itself takes race into account. While they are not enough to define diversity, the numbers really should be at the core of raceneutrality.
We should also note that under this second definition, Texas’s
Top Ten Percent Plan is not race-neutral: there are disparities in
standardized test scores between minority and non-minority students
68
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Plan.
68

For the UT entering class of 2009, among students automatically admitted via the Top
Ten Percent Law, White students (a total of 2,508 students) had a mean SAT score of
1864; African American students (a total of 297) had a mean SAT score of 1584; Asian
American students (a total of 1101) had a mean SAT score of 1874; and Hispanic
students (a total of 1256) had a mean SAT score of 1628. UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN
OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF TEX. AUT. ADMISSIONS LAW (HB
588) AT UNIV. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN: SAT MEAN AND FRESHMAN GPA BY UNDERGRADUATE
COLLEGES AND ETHNICITY ENTERING 2009, at 14 tbl. 7.
Others have contended that the Top Ten Percent Plan is not even formally raceneutral. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303–04 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Calling such 10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me disingenuous, for
they ‘unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation
of African-Americans and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’”); see also id.
at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]ercentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the
point scheme (and fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results without saying
directly what they are doing or why they are doing it.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct.
2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives [in Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law] as race
unconscious. . . .[T]he vaunted alternatives suffer from ‘the disadvantage of deliberate
obfuscation.’” (quotations omitted)); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 242
n.156 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (“A court considering the
constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent] Law would examine whether Texas enacted
the Law (and corresponding admissions policies) because of its effects on identifiable
racial groups or in spite of those effects.”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979) (holding that granting an absolute lifetime preference does not unfairly
discriminate against women); cf. Brief for Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL
402129, at *3, *9–10 (noting that “it is not clear that these [percentage] plans are actually
race-neutral” and that some amici counsel in Grutter “signaled interest in moving on after
this case to challenge these aspects of the Texas program”). But see Leslie Yalof Garfield,
The Paradox Of Race-Conscious Labels, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1523, 1567 (2014) (“By
categorizing the Texas [Top Ten Percent] Law as race-neutral, the Court turns a blind
eye to the segregation that serves as the foundation for assembling diverse student bodies
in the State’s post-secondary schools. . . .On the other hand . . . [l]abeling the Top Ten
Percent Law as race-conscious demands that courts subject it to rigorous strict scrutiny[,].
. . making it a likely candidate for constitutional demise.”); Eboni S. Nelson, What Price
Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War? 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8 (2005)
(arguing that “in order to be considered race-neutral . . . [i]t is only necessary that
[programs] do not allow applicants to be classified and/or selected based on their race or
ethnicity”). See also Reva Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of
Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 675 (2015) (noting that the Top
Ten Percent Plan “pursue[s] a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity” but
“does not classify individuals by race” and thus does not “trigger[] strict scrutiny.”).

Feb. 2015]

BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

841

One can also combine the two definitions of race-neutrality posited here: an “either-or” definition is plausible. Under this view, we
can deem an admissions policy as “race-neutral” if: (1) it is mechanistic rather than discretionary and does not formally access information
about an applicant’s race; or (2) regardless of whether the admissions
process accesses information about an applicant’s race, there are no
statistical disparities in academic criteria between admitted applicants
of different racial groups.
The Supreme Court, however, has stuck to a formal definition of
race-neutrality—one that is focused on the absence of race from the
admissions process. The Court has acted as if diversity and its educational benefits, holistic, individualized review of applicants, and formal race-neutrality are all compatible. But as the next Part shows,
they are not; they form a “Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions.
III. THE BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
By itself, the double-consciousness of diversity, race-neutrality, and
individualized review—the varying understandings of these terms in
Supreme Court litigation and opinions—creates enough confusion
about the future of race-conscious admissions policies. But even beyond this confusion, these three core tenets of the Supreme Court’s
doctrine on race-conscious admissions are incompatible. They cannot all be attained at the same time—they form a “Bermuda Triangle” for university admissions.
A. Fisher and the Bermuda Triangle: Still a Fishing Expedition
From one perspective, Fisher v. University of Texas illustrated well
the Bermuda Triangle of university admissions. The Fisher litigation
framed diversity largely in terms of numerical representation of minority groups, even if the language of the litigants’ briefs alluded to
educational benefits and the like. With changes in racial demographics—increasing numbers of Black and Latino/a residents in
Texas—the Top Ten Percent Plan might yield numerical representation of minority students equivalent to most holistic admissions
plans—if not now, then in the near future. Also, the Top Ten PerProfessor Siegel argues that in Fisher, the U.S. Supreme Court could not possibly have
“overlooked the race- conscious aims of the [Top Ten] percent program[,]” but “[n]o
Justice raised questions about the [plan’s] constitutionality[.]” Id. at 673–74. Of course,
the Fisher litigation did not raise a constitutional challenge to the Top Ten Percent Plan.
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cent Plan is formally race-neutral 69: race does not play any direct role
in admission of students. So two of the three tenets could be fulfilled.
But the Top Ten Percent Plan is not a holistic admissions policy
and does not include individualized review of applicants. Students
admitted to UT under the Top Ten Percent Plan did not have anyone exercise discretionary review over their applications: they were
admitted via an automatic formula that considered only their class
70
ranks. Fisher was an unusual case: the only reason it came in to being was that the Texas state legislature voluntarily adopted the Top
Ten Percent Law, and then-Governor George W. Bush signed it into
law. This has not happened in most states and could not practically
apply to private universities or graduate and professional schools. In
fact, the Grutter majority stated that percentage plans such as the Top
Ten Percent Plan are not adequate substitutes for race-conscious holistic admissions policies, which consider race and other diversity fac71
tors in a nuanced, individualized fashion. Grutter thus suggests that
courts cannot compel universities to adopt percentage plans, even if
the universities can attain numerical diversity similar to raceconscious holistic admissions.
Fisher was a very limited case to begin with, and it was never a good
venue for the Court to make a broad pronouncement on raceconsciousness. Rather, it is and always has been a “fishing expedi72
tion.”
B. Holistic Admissions and the Bermuda Triangle: The Numbers Still Don’t
Add Up
Looking beyond Fisher, if a university employs a holistic admissions
process with individualized review, then in most cases, it cannot
achieve both diversity and race-neutrality—regardless of how we define those tenets. As noted earlier, if the diversity interest incorpo69
70
71

72

But see supra note 68 (discussing different perspectives on whether the Top Ten Percent
Plan is actually “race-neutral.”).
See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) (West 2010).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (noting that percentage plans “may preclude the university from
conducting the individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is
not just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university”). The
Grutter majority also questioned how percentage plans could work for admission to
graduate and professional schools. Id. (noting the failure to explain how “‘percentage
plans,’ recently adopted by public undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and
California, to guarantee admission to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in
every high school in the State . . . could work for graduate and professional schools”).
See Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra note 36.
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rates admission of individuals who specifically defy racial stereotypes,
73
then there is no race-neutral admissions process that can attain it.
And if race-neutrality is defined in formal terms—as the absence of
information about race in the admissions process—then it cannot be
74
attained in a holistic admissions process with individualized review.
But what if we measure diversity solely by numerical representation,
and what if we define race-neutrality in statistical terms—as the absence of disparities in academic criteria between minority and nonminority admitted students?
In theory, it may be possible to have a holistic admissions plan, attain the desired numerical representation of minority groups, and
have no statistical disparities in academic criteria between racial
groups. In practice, however, it is not currently possible most of the
75
The underlying reason that universities need to use racetime.
conscious admissions policies is not to attain diversity per se, but because the magnitude of academic disparities between minority and
non-minority applicants would not allow them to attain this diversity

73
74
75

See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUND., A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE
UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES 26–61, available at
http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf (discussing the impact of state university
bans on race-conscious admissions policies on minority student enrollment). Mr.
Kahlenberg finds that through a combination of recruitment and use of socioeconomic
criteria and proxies for race as admissions factors, universities in Washington, Florida,
Georgia, and Nebraska have been able to recover to prior levels of Black and Latina/o
enrollment after experiencing initial drops in minority enrollment after bans on raceconscious admissions. Id. at 42, 46, 50 & 57. However, it is unclear how much this
recovery is due to demographic changes in the states (particularly the growing Latina/o
populations), rather than the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives. Additionally, state
universities in Washington and Nebraska had low numbers of Black and Latina/o
students even before enacting their bans (owing to the low percentage of minorities in
the state population overall), and recovery using recruitment and race-neutral factors in
those states did not require much. Id. at 42 & 47. These universities may never have
approached a “critical mass” of minority students to begin with. Even Justice Scalia
agreed that regardless of a state’s demographics, very low percentages of minority
students on campus does not constitute a critical mass. At the oral argument in Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), Justice Scalia asked “Why don’t you
seriously suggest that demographic—that the demographic makeup of the state has
nothing to do with whether somebody feels isolated, that if you’re in a state that is only 1
percent black that doesn’t mean that you’re not isolated, so long as there’s 1 percent in
the class? . . . I wish you would take that position because it seems, to me, right.” See
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 15.
Moreover, in 15 years, the flagship public universities in California (UC Berkeley and
UCLA) have not recovered to the levels of minority enrollment that they had before
California’s ban on race-conscious admissions, in spite of a significant increase in the
minority population of California. See KAHLENBERG, supra, at 36, 38.
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absent consideration of race. 76 For the most part, the Fisher litigation
ignored the most significant reason that most universities use raceconscious admissions policies—because of disparities in academic
77
admissions criteria between minority and non-minority applicants.
In her Grutter majority opinion, Justice O’Connor acknowledged this
reality:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with
high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the inter78
est approved today.

76

77

78

THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER SEPARATE, NOT
YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFE 10, 92–93
(2009) (reporting that in sample of 9,100 student respondents from eight highly-selective
public and private institutions of higher education, compared to White admittees, racerelated admissions plus factors were equivalent to 310 points (out of 1,600 total) for Black
admittees and 130 points for Hispanic admittees, while Asian admittees outscored Whites
by 140 points). For projected effects of eliminating race-conscious admissions on
minority enrollments, see id. at 464–65 (private institutions), and id. at 480–81 (public
institutions). Both private and public institutions would see significant declines in Black
and Hispanic enrollment with the elimination of race-conscious admissions policies.
Justice Clarence Thomas did make mention of academic disparities in his concurrence.
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Blacks and Hispanics admitted to the
University [of Texas at Austin] . . . are, on average, far less prepared than their white and
Asian classmates. . . .[T]he University . . . has [not] presented a shred of evidence that
black and Hispanic students are able to close this substantial gap during their time at the
University.”).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Ironically, in 2003, Justice O’Connor was all too willing to suggest a time limit for
race-conscious admissions policies, one-half century after the Supreme Court refused to
do so with school desegregation. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(ordering racial integration of segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed”). But
see infra note 85–86 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor herself later suggested that twenty-five years was not a
binding time limit on race-conscious admissions. See Sandra Day O’Connor & Stewart J.
Schwab, Affirmative Action in Higher Education over the Next Twenty-Five Years: A Need for
Study and Action, in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58, 62 (David L. Featherman,
Martin Hall & Marvin Krislov eds., 2010) (“That 25-year expectation is, of course, far from
binding on any justices who may be responsible for entertaining a challenge to an
affirmative-action program in 2028.”). Both parties in Fisher also agreed that the twentyfive year limit was not binding. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 41, at 11
(citing the plaintiff’s counsel, Bert Rein, as answering “No, I don’t” to Justice Scalia’s
question, “do you think that Grutter held that there is no more affirmative action in
higher education after 2028?”); id. at 50 (citing counsel for UT, Gregory Garre, as noting
that “we don’t read Grutter as establishing that kind of time clock”). However, at the Fisher
oral argument, Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer at least hinted that the twentyfive year period was legally significant. Id. at 50 (citing Justice Scalia as stating that Grutter
“holds for . . . only . . . [s]ixteen more years”); id. at 8 (citing Justice Breyer as noting that
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Justice O’Connor’s statement implies that the need for raceconscious admissions policies is contingent upon racial disparities in
academic criteria. Moreover, in spite of their vast ideological differences, both Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thomas acknowledged that racial disparities in academic criteria are the
underlying reason why universities need to use race-conscious admissions policies to attain diversity, and they both questioned Justice
O’Connor’s aspiration here that racial disparities in academic criteria
79
could be eliminated by 2028.
As such, even if we accepted a purely numerical definition of the
diversity interest, it is not possible in most cases to attain appreciable
numbers of minority students, unless universities use race as a flexible
“plus factor” to compensate for academic disparities between groups.
80
The “logical end point” of race-conscious admissions will occur
when such disparities no longer exist. At that time, it will be possible
for universities to simultaneously use a holistic admissions process
with individualized review, attain sufficient numerical diversity, and
achieve statistical race-neutrality on academic criteria among admit81
ted applicants of all racial groups. But that time is still far off.
C. Summing Up the Bermuda Triangle: Two Out of Three Ain’t Good
Enough
For the foreseeable future, diversity, race-neutrality, and individualized review will form a Bermuda Triangle for university admissions.

79

80
81

“Grutter said it would be good law for at least 25 years”). Later in the oral arguments,
Justice Breyer stated that he “agree[d] it might” be the holding of Grutter that there can
be no race-conscious admissions policies after 2028. Id. at 12.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[I]t remains the current
reality that many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal
educational opportunities. Despite these inequalities, some minority students are able to
meet the high threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s finest
undergraduate and graduate educational institutions. As lower school education in
minority communities improves, an increase in the number of such students may be
anticipated. From today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over
the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal
opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.”); Id. at 375–76 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on any evidence
that the gap in credentials between black and white students is shrinking or will be gone
in that timeframe. . . . No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the
racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years.”). As noted, Justice
O’Connor herself later backtracked from the twenty-five year timing for an end to raceconscious admissions. See supra note 78.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in
time. . . .[A]ll governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”).
See supra note 79.
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Universities might be able to attain diversity (in terms of numerical
representation) and formal race-neutrality, but not through a holistic
admissions plan with individualized review. They could use individualized review and have a statistically race-neutral admissions policy,
but that would compromise diversity (in terms of educational benefits
and numerical representation). And they can and do attain diversity
(in terms of educational benefits and numerical representation) and
have individualized review, but the holistic admissions plans they use
to do so—currently the norm at elite universities—are not raceneutral.

THE BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
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IV. CONCLUSION: STILL SERVING TWO MASTERS
The double-consciousness of race-consciousness and the Bermuda
Triangle of university admissions leave much uncertainty about the
future of race-conscious admissions policies. The Supreme Court has
82
taken W.E.B. Du Bois’s proverbial “problem of the color line” and
83
About the only
tied it into a complex, doctrinal Gordian knot.
things we can be sure of are that: (1) race-conscious policies will continue to generate much controversy and debate—albeit mainly in
lower courts and state governments rather than at the U.S. Supreme
Court; and (2) advocates of race-consciousness will continue to face
their own double-consciousness, reconciling the fight for racial equity
in higher education and the confusing and convoluted doctrine that
we must navigate to get there.
A. “With All Deliberate Speed”: The Future of Race-Conscious Admissions
While a majority of Justices on the Supreme Court would like to
see an end to race-conscious admissions policies, we still have them.
Fisher suggests that the Justices are not willing to end race-conscious
policies in one fell swoop, and Schuette indicates they are content with
84
state-level politics resolving the issue. In an ironic twist—déjà vu
85
right amidst Brown’s diamond anniversary —the Supreme Court
seems content to let race-conscious admissions slip away gradually:
86
“with all deliberate speed.”
How might this happen? It will probably involve both law and politics. While the Supreme Court punted in Fisher, the case still has a
legal impact: it allows lower courts do the dirty work. District and
82
83

84
85

86

See DU BOIS, supra note 7.
The “Gordian knot” metaphor is associated with Alexander the Great and refers to an
intractable problem that requires an unorthodox solution. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
KING HENRY THE FIFTH, ACT 1, sc. 1. (“Turn him to any cause of policy, The Gordian Knot
of it he will unloose, Familiar as his garter . . . .”); see also Harpalani, supra note 2, at 83
(noting how American race relations in the twenty-first century have “tied the proverbial
‘color line’ into a Gordian Knot.”).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools
were unconstitutional). The first Brown decision occurred on May 17, 1954. Id. The
Supreme Court then addressed the appropriate remedy for racially segregated schools in
1955. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(ordering racial integration of
segregated public schools “with all deliberate speed.”). This second Brown decision
occurred on May 31, 1955. Id. Thus, it is now right between Brown I and Brown II’s
diamond anniversaries.
Brown, 349 U.S. at 301. The Court’s vague and tenuous language, embodied by the
phrase,“with all deliberate speed,” allowed Southern states to resist desegregation for
many years—another twist of irony.
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circuit courts can interpret ambiguities in definitions of diversity and
race-neutrality to either uphold or to strike down specific raceconscious admissions programs. In particular, Fisher’s call for stringent review, with “no deference” to universities on the implementa87
tion of race-conscious policies, may invite district court judges to
strike down these policies—especially where the link between raceconsciousness and the educational benefits of diversity is not clearly
articulated or demonstrated. Lower courts may well differ in their
application of the law, based on specific attributes of admissions policies and on political leanings of judges.
The result is likely to be a very fractured jurisprudence. Lower
courts may come to various conclusions about the meaning and
measurement of the diversity interest, about how much can be inferred from numerical representation, about whether universities
bear the burden to show educational benefits of diversity in addition
to numerical representation, and about how universities must link
88
the two. Courts might also view race-neutrality in different ways,
and they may have different standards for evaluating the efficacy of
race-neutral alternatives in producing diversity. Eventually, another
case will make it back to the Supreme Court. We cannot predict the
timing of said case: twenty-five years elapsed between Bakke (1978)
and Gratz and Grutter (2003), and then another ten years elapsed before Fisher (2013). We also cannot predict the result, which will depend, more than anything else, on the composition of the Court at
the given time.
But it might not even come to that, if the political aspect predominates. With its 2014 ruling in Schuette, the Court upheld the ability of
states to pass constitutional bans on race-conscious policies. California, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and Oklahoma have
89
Additionally, racealready passed such state constitutional bans.
87

88

89

See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013) (“[A] University must
prove that the [race-conscious] means it chose to attain . . . diversity are narrowly tailored
to its goal. On this point, the University receives no deference.”).
This debate has already started with Judge Emilio Garza’s dissent in Fisher on remand. See
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 672 (5th Cir. 2014) (Garza, J., dissenting)
(“[A]ssuming that the University’s diversity goal is establishing classroom diversity, it is
the University that bears the burden of proving that the use of race . . . is necessary to
furthering this goal.”). Judge Garza critiqued the Fisher remand majority opinion for
“continu[ing] to defer impermissibly to the University’s claims . . . deference [which] is
squarely at odds with the central lesson of [the Supreme Court’s ruling in] Fisher.” Id. at
662 (Garza, J., dissenting).
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE ACTION
(2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-stateaction.aspx.
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conscious policies have been banned via executive action in Florida,90
91
and via state legislative action in New Hampshire. Political process
at the state level may continue to eliminate race-conscious admissions
92
policies in many states before the Supreme Court takes up the constitutionality of such policies again. By then, if most states have already banned race-conscious policies, a Supreme Court ruling on
eliminating race-conscious admissions might be a mere rubber stamp,
reeling in any outlier jurisdictions that still allow them.
Law and politics could also fold back on each other. In jurisdictions with state constitutional bans on race-conscious policies, such as
California and Michigan, there could be legal challenges contending
93
that universities still use race surreptitiously. As noted earlier, there
have been such accusations in California, and Justices Souter and
94
Ginsburg have warned us about this phenomenon. If such legal
challenges come to bear, they would be different from Bakke, Gratz,
90
91
92

93
94

Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999).
H.B. 623, 2011 Leg. (N.H. 2011) (codified as amended in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 187 &
188).
It is also possible that voters in some states will reject referenda to eliminate affirmative
action, as occurred in Colorado in 2008. See Colleen Slevin, Colorado Voters Reject
Affirmative Action Ban, USA Today, Nov. 7, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
politics/2008-11-07-1129194800_x.htm (“By 51 percent to 49 percent, Coloradans
rejected a proposed constitutional ban on considering race or gender in state hiring,
contracting and college admissions.”). Additionally, a recent poll in California indicated
that a majority of residents of each racial group supported “affirmative action programs
designed to help blacks, women, and other minorities get better jobs and education[.]”
See Karthick Ramakrishnan & Taeku Lee, Views of a Diverse Electorate: Opinions of California
Registered Voters in 2014, NAT’L ASIAN AM. SURV. 8 (Aug. 2014), available at http://www.
naasurvey.com/resources/Home/NAAS-Field-2014-final.pdf.
See supra note 63.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304–05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One can
reasonably anticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority
enrollment . . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of
affirmative action plans . . . . Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher
education may resort to camouflage. For example, schools may encourage applicants to
write of their cultural traditions in the essays they submit, or to indicate whether English
is their second language. Seeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants may
highlight the minority group associations to which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames
of their mothers or grandparents. In turn, teachers’ recommendations may emphasize
who a student is as much as what he or she has accomplished. . . . If honesty is the best
policy, surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action
program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and
disguises.”). Justice Ginsburg reiterated this concern in her Fisher dissent. See Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As for
holistic review, if universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many may ‘resort
to camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’” (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the
ball.”).
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Grutter, and Fisher. The universities involved would deny any intentional use of race in admissions; to do otherwise would be an admission of unlawful activity. Plaintiffs in such cases would have the high95
96
er burden of proving intent, which would create quite a quandary.
In short, the double-consciousness of race-consciousness and the
Bermuda Triangle of university admissions pervade the Supreme
Court’s rulings and render them a convoluted mess, open to highly
varying interpretations. Lower courts will have to deal with this mess
until the Supreme Court gives further guidance, and it is likely that
political actors—be they district court judges with strong feelings
about the issue or state politicians seeking affirmative action bans—
will decide the foreseeable future of race-conscious admissions policies.
B. Double-Consciousness or Doublethink?: Victory is Defeat
Finally, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions and
the Bermuda Triangle of university admissions, it is important to
highlight the continuing double-consciousness of advocates of raceconsciousness. Like the late Professor Derrick Bell, many such advo97
cates are not huge fans of the diversity interest. Although we may
value diversity, we would prefer more social justice-oriented rationales for race-conscious admissions, such as remediation for the effects
98
of racial discrimination. We also fear that many of the risks that
95

96

97
98

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court has
“not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of
government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects against
discrimination that occurs “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group”). Alternatively, a federal constitutional claim might rest on “a
clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,” even if proof of intent is
lacking. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
The question would then become: what constitutes a “clear pattern”?
Of course, where there are state constitutional bans on race-conscious admissions
policies, state courts could apply a different standard to allow disparate impact to serve as
a basis for claims under those constitutional bans.
See supra notes 3–6.
See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Affirmative Action After Grutter: Reflections on a Tortured
Death, Imagining a Humanity-Affirming Reincarnation, 63 LA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2003)
(contending “that the standard ‘diversity’ rationale for affirmative action . . . is not a
remedial or corrective justice-based rationale, and hence, fails to address the central
concerns of traditionally disadvantaged groups.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of
Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling “Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for
Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 913–14 (2010) (“The problem
with the diversity rationale . . . is that it has come to serve as a de facto proxy for remedial

Feb. 2015]

BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

851

Professor Bell warned of a decade ago have come to bear: diversity
distracts attention from important issues of race and class justice,
from efforts to reform universities’ reliance on admissions criteria
such as grades and test scores, and from elite universities’ tendency to
99
admit the most privileged members of minority groups. In Professor Bell’s words, affirmative action advocates feel like we are still
“serving two masters”—freedom for elite universities and social justice
100
for poor people of color —and trying to make sense of a confusing
and convoluted doctrine to do so.
Despite his warnings, Professor Bell acknowledged that confronting the real issues would “not be easy and [would] be resisted fierce101
Indeed, they constitute a direct confrontation not only with
ly.”
mismatch theorists and other affirmative action opponents, but also
102
The diversity rationale—now thrice
with university administrators.
103
reinforced by the Supreme Court and tied to individualized review
and holistic admissions—appears much safer. But Professor Bell still
104
preferred those tougher battles to diversity’s distractions because
those battles confronted the real issues that can lead towards racial

99
100

101
102

103
104

concerns.”); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 34 (2002) (“[M]any of affirmative action’s more forthright defenders
readily concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy
that they prefer to justify on other grounds.”). The Supreme Court has rejected “the
remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination’” as a compelling interest, stating that
societal discrimination constitutes “an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless
in its reach into the past.” City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496–98
(1989) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 8–12; See also Bell, supra note 3, at 1632 (“Diversity. . . is
less a means of continuing minority admissions programs in the face of widespread opposition than it is a shield behind which college administrators can retain policies of admission that are. . . convenient vehicles for admitting the children of wealth and privilege.
Justice O’Connor is comfortable with having elites handle admissions and then legitimate
their choices with a critical mass of people of color.”).
Bell, supra note 3, at 1633.
See id. (“[T]he long-overdue reform of admissions standards . . . will be resisted fiercely by
many if not most of those colleges and graduate schools with whom civil rights advocates
joined in the effort to save minority admissions through the distraction we are calling
diversity.”).
See supra notes 1, 19 & 25.
See Bell, supra note 3, at 1633 (“It may be that challenges by civil rights and community
groups calling attention to the inaccuracies and unfairness of standardized tests will lead
to their revision or even abandonment. If that effort is successful, it will not be the first
time that civil rights campaigns initiated to remedy racial barriers resulted in reforms that
worked to the benefit of all. . . . Predictably, though, the long-overdue reform of admissions standards will not be easy and will be resisted fiercely by many if not most of those
colleges and graduate schools with whom civil rights advocates joined in the effort to save
minority admissions through the distraction we are calling diversity.”).
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equality. From a strategic perspective, it is debatable whether Professor Bell was correct, but regardless, he was well-known for challeng105
ing the civil rights orthodoxy and for confronting authority more
106
By expressing his own double-consciousness, he gave
generally.
voice to the profound ambivalence felt by many advocates of racial
justice in the years after the civil rights movement. Nevertheless, in
W.E.B. Du Bois’s words, Professor Bell was truly “gifted with a second107
sight,” and his insights influenced several generations of legal
108
109
scholars and social activists, including me.
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fisher in June 2013,
my immediate reaction was that it was “the best realistic outcome for
proponents of affirmative action (I consider myself to be a strong
one)” and that “proponents of affirmative action should declare vic110
tory for now,” in spite of the fact that the Court had ruled against
111
And one year later, when
UT by vacating its lower court victory.
Schuette upheld Michigan’s state constitutional ban on race-conscious
112
admissions, right on Grutter’s original victory ground, my commen113
I focused
tary on HuffPost Live similarly spun a defeat positively.
on the fact that Colorado voters had rejected a state referendum to
105
106

107

108

109

110

111
112
113

See Bell, supra note 3, at 1633 (arguing that reforms “initiated to remedy racial barriers”
often “provide more advances for whites than for blacks”).
See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER xi
(1994) (encouraging readers to confront the wrongs that “afflict their lives and the lives
of others”).
DU BOIS, supra note 7, at 3 (“After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the
Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness,
but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world.” (emphasis
added)).
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle that Famous House?, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2000) (“Derrick Bell . . . conducted me to intellectual realms
hitherto unknown and unimagined, opening up vistas I never knew existed. And . . . he
never charged me a nickel, and left me secure, as a reader and now a friend, that I was
always in good hands.”).
See Harpalani, supra note 13, at xxiii, xxviii (describing Professor Derrick Bell’s teaching
and life philosophies and his impact on students); Vinay Harpalani, Tributes in Memory of
Professor Derrick Bell, DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE (Oct. 16, 2011),
http://professorderrickbell.com/tributes/vinay-harpalani/ (same).
Vinay Harpalani, Affirmative Action Survives—For Now, IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY BLOG
(June 24, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/06/24/affirmative-actionsurvives-for-now.
See supra note 16.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Affirmative Action: SCOTUS Upholds Michigan Ban (Huffpost Live broadcast Apr. 22, 2014),
available at http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/segment/affirmative-action-scotus-uhpoldsmichigan-ban/5353ba20fe34449b6f00024e (featuring Vinay Harpalani in a discussion of
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action).
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ban race-conscious policies not too long ago, 114 demonstrating that
115
social activism could convince voters to reject these bans. My forthcoming piece in the Seton Hall Law Review also charges forward: it argues that the Court’s broad definition of the diversity interest allows
universities to defend race-conscious admissions policies, and it pro116
poses novel strategies for universities to do so.
117
I could conMost recently, UT prevailed in Fisher on remand.
clude this Article by once again claiming a victory for affirmative ac118
119
But
tion, as I did after Grutter, and on several occasions since.
120
double-consciousness is indeed a “peculiar sensation” —it is fraught
with Orwellian irony and often feels more like doublethink: “holding
two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting
121
The Fisher remand appeal to the Supreme Court
both of them.”
122
still looms, and recently an anti-affirmative action organization
123
(ironically named “Students for Fair Admissions”) filed two new
114
115

116

117
118
119
120
121

122
123

See Slevin, supra note 92.
See id. (noting that opponents of Colorado’s proposed ban on affirmative action
“launched a door-to-door campaign . . . [and] ran radio ads in English and Spanish
against the amendment”).
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious
Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“This Article argues
that Fisher v. Texas does not spell doom for race-conscious admissions policies, in spite of
its call for universities to seriously examine whether race-neutral alternatives can attain
the educational benefits of diversity.”).
See supra note 16.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
DU BOIS, supra note 7 (“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness . . . .”).
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 224 (Knopf Doubleday Publ’g Grp. 2009) (defining
“doublethink” as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them”). 1984’s dystopian world also gives the
ironic Party slogans of “War is Peace,” “Freedom is Slavery,” and “Ignorance is Strength”).
Id. at 6. 1984 is in many ways similar to Professor Derrick Bell’s own dystopian narratives
in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) and FACES AT
THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
See supra note 16.
Organizations that focus on eliminating race-conscious university admissions often
choose such ironic names, such as “Center for Equal Opportunity” and “the Project on
Fair Representation.” See Center for Equal Opportunity: The Nation’s Only Conservative Think
Tank Devoted to Issues of Race and Ethnicity, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY,
http://www.ceousa.org; Welcome to the Project on Fair Representation!, PROJECT ON FAIR
REPRESENTATION, http://www.projectonfairrepresentation.org. Anti-affirmative action
ballot initiatives are also given ironic names; California’s Proposition 209 is called the
California Civil Rights Initiative, Washington’s Initiative 200 is called the Washington
Civil Rights Initiative, and Michigan’s Proposal 2 is called the Michigan Civil Rights
Initiative. See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1397 (1997) (“Proposition 209 is called the California Civil Rights
Initiative because it restates the historic Civil Rights Act and proclaims simply and clearly:
‘The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
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lawsuits, challenging race-conscious admissions policies at Harvard
124
University and at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I
can only conclude with Professor Bell’s prophetic admonition that
“civil rights victory” would indeed be “hard to distinguish from de125
feat.”

124

125

individual or group, on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.’”); Paul Guppy,
Policy Brief—A Citizen’s Guide to Initiative 200: The Washington State Civil Rights Initiative,
WASH. POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 1998), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/
brief/citizens-guide-initiative-200-washington-state-civil-rights-initiative
(referring
to
Washington’s Initative 200 as “the Washington Civil Rights Initiative); The Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative: News and Commentary, ADVERSITY.NET (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.
adversity.net/michigan/mcri_mainframe.htm (referring to Michigan’s Proposal 2 as “the
Michigan Civil Rights Initative”). All of these names are again reminiscent of George
Orwell’s 1984, supra note 121, in which the Ministry of Peace focused on perpetuating
warfare, the Ministry of Truth focused on propaganda and distortion of history, and the
Ministry of Love focused on torturing dissidents and forcing them to comply with Big
Brother’s directives. See id. at 6.
Nick Anderson, Lawsuits Allege Unlawful Racial Bias in Admissions at Harvard, UNC-Chapel
Hill, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
lawsuits-allege-unlawful-racial-bias-in-admissions-at-harvard-unc-chapel-hill/2014/11/17/
b117b966-6e9a-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html (discussing the two pending lawsuits
alleging unlawful bias in admission policies at Harvard University and the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill brought by a group plaintiff called “Students for Fair
Admissions”); Lyle Denniston, Direct New Challenges to Bakke Ruling (FURTHER
UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
11/direct-new-challenges-to-bakke-ruling/ (describing the lawsuits against Harvard
University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and characterizing them as
sequels to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin).
Bell, supra note 3, at 1622.

